Florida Institute of Technology

Scholarship Repository @ Florida Tech
Theses and Dissertations
7-2014

Airline Consumers’ Perception of Transport Security
Administration’s Prohibited Items
Clayton Ernest D'souza
Florida Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.fit.edu/etd
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons

Recommended Citation
D'souza, Clayton Ernest, "Airline Consumers’ Perception of Transport Security Administration’s Prohibited
Items" (2014). Theses and Dissertations. 13.
https://repository.fit.edu/etd/13

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ Florida Tech. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @
Florida Tech. For more information, please contact kheifner@fit.edu.

	
  

Airline Consumers’ Perception of
Transport Security Administration’s Prohibited Items

by
Clayton Ernest D’souza

Bachelor of Science Aviation Management with Flight
Florida Institute of Technology
2011

Bachelor of Science Electrical Engineering
Florida Institute of Technology
2006

A thesis submitted to the
College of Aeronautics at Florida Institute of Technology
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Science
in
Applied Aviation Safety

Melbourne, Florida
July, 2014

We the undersigned committee hereby recommend that the attached document be
Accepted as fulfilling in part the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
in
Applied Aviation Safety.

“Airline Consumers’ Perception of
Transport Security Administration’s Prohibited Items”
A thesis by
Clayton Ernest D’souza

__________________________________________________
Scott Winter, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Science,
College of Aeronautics,
Major Advisor

__________________________________________________
Stephen Rice, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Human Factors,
College of Aeronautics

__________________________________________________
Alan B. Brown, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Chemistry,
College of Science

_______________________________________________________	
  

Stephen K. Cusick, J.D.
Associate Professor,
College of Aeronautics,
Graduate Program Chair
	
  
	
  

	
  

ABSTRACT
Airline Consumers’ Perception of
Transport Security Administration’s Prohibited Items

by
Clayton Ernest D’souza
Committee Chairperson: Scott Winter, Ph.D.
There has been limited research conducted and significantly limited
scholarly articles on consumer attitudes towards the current TSA prohibited items
list. If the research were to be conducted a year after the September 11, 2001
attacks, the results of the research would be negatively skewed, indicating the
majority of passengers would approve of the TSA prohibited list. But after almost
thirteen years since the devastating act of terrorism and no major attempt to repeat a
similar terrorist activity, would airline consumers continue to fly if the TSA
amended the prohibited items list and allowed passengers to bring on liquids and
sharp objects in their carry-on luggage? The current study analyzed a passenger’s
perception on the TSA’s prohibited items list, specifically, liquids, gels, aerosols,
and sharp objects in carry-on luggage. The study examined three different
dependent variables – comfort, trust, and willingness to fly, if the TSA permitted or
prohibited liquid, gels, and sharp objects in a carry-on. Overall, participants
demonstrated a positive perception to scenarios prohibiting sharp objects and a
neutral perception to scenarios permitting sharp objects.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Aviation Security has changed significantly post September 11, 2001. The
substantial change came in the form of the Transportation Security Administration,
also known as the TSA. The formation of TSA on November 11, 2011
revolutionized aviation security by enforcing thorough screening techniques to
avert terrorist activity. The agency introduced new regulations, such as a prohibited
items list and an intensive screening method for all travelling passengers (TSA,
2014). The change helped avoid the repetition of the September 11 attacks but
created distress and frustration among airline consumers due to extensive, and
perhaps invasive, security procedures. It has been thirteen years since the formation
of TSA, and the preventive measures to combat any acts of terrorism has only
intensified.
Flying has been a preferred mode of transportation among people living in
the U.S., especially with the emergence of multiple low-cost airlines. According to
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) forecast, the total number of people
flying commercially on U.S. airlines will increase by 0.2 percent to 732 million in
2012, then to 746 million in 2013, and then increase more rapidly to 1.2 billion in
2032 (Price, 2012). This would imply longer wait times at airports and further
delays in order to accommodate this growth. Passengers who have flown in the past
year have experienced full body scanners, use of swabs or Explosive Trace
Detection machines, or been thoroughly patted down, and in some instances,
experienced all three. These tests are time consuming and often cause frustration
among passengers because it causes delays and ultimately contributes to longer
1	
  
	
  

	
  

wait times. During the sequester (US Government shutdown) in 2013, wait times at
the majority of the busier airports doubled significantly due to insufficient TSA
agents. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for trying to find the
proper balance between hiring additional TSA agents while investing in new
technology to screen baggage and passengers to meet the growth of passengers
travelling each year despite budget constraints. Finding this balance will be
essential to aviation security because it would imply amending the prohibited items
list or discontinuing certain screening procedures to decrease wait times at airports.
This decision, in turn, may benefit airlines in terms of on-time departures because
the airline industry has adopted better security measures to avoid a possible
hijacking such as: Installed Physical Secondary Barriers (IPSBs) to restrict access
to the hardened cockpit door during door transitions, the Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS), and the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program (Stewart &
Mueller, 2013).
All items on the current TSA prohibited items list in carry-on luggage came
about either due to an event or classified information that was provided by
international agencies, in which items could potentially pose a threat to air travel.
Prior to 2001, the FAA permitted passengers to bring on board blades that were
four inches or shorter in length. The regulation was amended post 2001 because
investigators believe the hijackers bought box-cutter knives whose blades were less
than four inches in length (Griffith, Speigel, & Williamson, 2002). Despite
restrictions on sharp objects, passengers continue to bring sharp objects in their
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carry-on luggage. This likely happens either because passengers are absent-minded
or unaware the sharp objects are in the carry-on luggage, or, in some instances,
employees working for the airport, airline, or government believe that the security
measures do not apply to them, and when these people are caught, they justify their
actions by informing TSA that they were just testing the system (Forest & Price,
2013). Regardless, TSA continues to notify and inform passengers of all the items
seized on a weekly basis at airports all over the U.S. via their website. The ban on
liquids and gels came about in 2006 when British police foiled an attempt by
hijackers to bring down aircraft bound for Canada and USA by using liquid-based
explosives. The restrictions were eventually relaxed and the current 3-1-1
regulations on liquids were adopted by the TSA in 2006.
In a recent survey of more than 3,200 U.S. air travelers by travel web site
Trip Advisor ®, 39 percent cited long security lines as the most annoying part of
being at an airport (Weber, 2010). There are multiple websites that publish articles
on “Step by Step Guide to Get Through Airport Security in Record Time,” but the
guides are not guaranteed or published by a professional/scholarly researcher who
has tried and tested the method. The TSA does provide guides on their website,
www.tsa.gov, on how passengers can go through the security screening process in
an efficient, quick manner. If more passengers did take the time to read the TSA
published articles and guides, wait times could possibly decrease significantly
because then each passenger would be aware of which items should be better off
being packed in a checked-in luggage rather than in a carry-on, or how wearing
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limited accessories can result in walking through the full body scanner quickly.
Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be considered a drawback, given the large amounts
spent on acquiring state of the art screening equipment, detailed security training
programs for airline employees, and a detailed database of all passengers flying on
board a U.S. carrier. One would expect the TSA to begin lifting the ban on certain
prohibited items, but there have been no amendments to the current regulations and
wait times continue to increase, especially during holidays and weekends. This is
because TSA is required to monitor every carry-on luggage and passenger for
possibly trying to bring a prohibited item on board, including a bottle of water.
In April 2013, TSA announced that small knives and sporting equipment
would be allowed on board an aircraft (TSA Blog Team, 2013). (Refer to Appendix
E for sizes of sharp objects permitted.) Airline crewmembers and law enforcement
representatives heavily criticized this announcement. According to the TSA, the
new guideline was intended to allow security screeners to better focus their efforts
on detecting more threatening items, such as explosives (Elliott, 2013). TSA’s
proposed regulation change failed to gain momentum and was eventually
withdrawn citing additional security research was needed before an amendment
could be made to the prohibited items list. TSA’s decision to amend the prohibited
items list could be considered as an initial step towards reverting back to pre-9/11
airport security. The introduction of advanced technology for screening and
extensive data collection on travelling passengers has benefited airport security and
increased the level of safety. Consumers have accepted these changes because it is
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the price that must be paid to avoid another terrorist attack. Nevertheless, the
possibility of items, such as a bottle of wine or a small knife, may eventually be
allowed on board an aircraft in the distant future.
The Ex-TSA Director, Kip Hawely, stated that it is not the objects but the
travelers that must be given increased scrutiny (US Today, 2005). Passengers
wanting to cause harm can go to any length to use items not on the TSA prohibited
list to create a lethal weapon. It is the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
responsibility to develop an effective screening technique, such as the screening
methods currently used by airports in Israel. Adopting the Israeli airport screening
methods can become vital to achieving safer skies, and with current successful
DHS programs, such as TSA Pre Check & Global Entry, DHS and TSA has already
laid the foundation for a successful level of aviation security we currently
experience. Global Entry is a U.S Custom Border Control (CBP) program and TSA
Pre Check is a TSA program that allows preapproved, low-risk travelers expedited
clearance upon entry into the United States and passengers traveling domestically
within the U.S. (Forest & Price, 2013). Passengers have to undergo a rigorous
background check before being accepted into either of the programs.
Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to gather consumer perceptions
on current TSA policies in regards to what items may or may not be carried on a
commercial airliner, specifically items related to liquids, gels, and sharp objects,
and demonstrate their willingness, trust, and comfort to continue flying if they were
permitted.
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Problem Statement
The study is designed to understand the perception of travelling passengers
of the current TSA’s prohibited items list. Airport security has seen a major
upgrade in terms of equipment, screening techniques, and passenger information.
Despite these advancements, TSA continues to add items to the prohibited items
list, which, to a degree, has increased the level of frustration among travelling
passengers. But TSA’s decision in 2013 to permit certain sharp objects raised major
concerns primarily among airline groups, given members of these groups have been
provided with additional security training, a reinforced door, FFDO, Air Marshals,
and self-defense programs. While passengers have grown accustomed to these
security measures, there is insufficient data to demonstrate if passengers would be
accepting of these proposed changes. It is reasonable that one might expect the
TSA to lift the ban on bringing bottles of water through airport security before
permitting sharp objects in carry-on luggage Therefore, this research study will
demonstrate if passengers will continue to fly if liquids, gels, and sharp objects
were permitted on board.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of the study is to analyze the current perception of TSA’s
prohibited items, specifically, liquids, gels, and aerosols over three ounces and
sharp objects in carry-on luggage by airline consumers. There has been no
significant aviation security related event after the formation of the TSA, given the
upgraded screening technology and multiple security programs developed and
enforced since September 11, 2001. Due to the vast security improvements at all

6

	
  

U.S. airports, this study will investigate if passengers are willing to accept possible
TSA changes to lifting the ban on the liquids, gels, and aerosols size limit and sharp
objects on board commercial aircraft.
Research Questions
The pre-experimental study will focus on two items currently on the TSA’s
prohibited items list in carry-on luggage: liquids and sharp objects. This will serve
as a base line for the quantitative thesis. The research question under investigation
is: What is the airline consumers’ perception of items currently prohibited by the
Transportation Security Association in carry-on luggage?
The sub research questions are as follows:
1. What is the perception of participant’s comfort, trust, and willingness of
flying if the ban on liquid sizes that can be carried on board an aircraft in
carry-on luggage is lifted?
2. What is the perception of participant’s comfort, trust, and willingness of
flying if the ban on sharp objects that can be carried on board an aircraft in
a carry-on luggage is lifted?
The dependent variables for this study are the comfort, trust, and willingness to fly
levels of consumers as measured using a Likert-type scale. The independent
variables will be the amount of allowed liquids and the ban or non-ban of sharp
objects.
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Study Significance
The significance of the study is to highlight the perception of airline
consumers toward the TSA’s decision to lift the ban on two items that are currently
prohibited from being brought on board an aircraft in carry-on luggage: liquids and
sharp objects. More importantly, the project will try to determine if a positive or
negative attitude exists towards certain items being allowed on board an aircraft
that were previously used in one form or another to conduct an act of terrorism.
There are very few studies that investigate consumer’s attitudes towards items on
the TSA prohibited item list. This study may possibly demonstrate that consumers
would continue to fly with the revised list but may feel more or less safe while
flying. The majority of the controversy stems from the airline community, but
given the extensive measures currently enforced by the TSA, a few changes can
reduce the level of frustration among travelling passengers and possibly make
flying a less frustrating experience for travelers.
Delimitations and Limitations
The following are limitations to the current study:
1. Prohibited items is a sensitive subject, therefore participants may answer
questions on the survey based on emotion.
2. The survey is voluntary in nature. It will be hard to tell whether every
subject will dedicate his or her full attention to finish the test.
3. Participants in the study may have limited knowledge of the improved
security system (layered security system), which can affect the results of the
survey.
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4. Participants with significant experience or knowledge of the current security
system can influence the results of the study in a negative or positive
manner.
5. Given the lower age limit for the study is 18 years, there may be a
possibility for bias in the study.
6. Gender can affect the study because females may demonstrate a negative
attitude towards sharp objects but a positive attitude towards liquid, gels,
and aerosols sizes.
7. Race can affect the study because non-Caucasian individuals may
demonstrate a negative attitude lifting the ban because they may be subject
to extensive screening or experience profiling, while Caucasian individuals
may demonstrate a positive or neutral attitude towards lifting the ban.
8. Certain individuals may not be truthful when answering the survey or not
truly understand the question when answering the survey because
participants are provided a monitory compensation upon completing the
survey.
The following are delimitations to the current study:
1. Participants that travelled on board a Part 121 scheduled carrier within the
U.S. will only be considered for the study.
2. The survey will be limited to only participant’s age 18 and older.
3. Participants will only be considered if they have travelled on a commercial
airline since January 1, 2007 within the U.S.
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Definition of Terms
Throughout this study, the term “prohibited items” includes liquids, gels,
aerosols, and sharp objects. The term “prohibit” is defined as to forbid by authority,
where the authority is considered to be the Transport Security Administration
(Prohibit, 2011).
“Perception” refers to the experience of obtaining sensory information
about the world of people, things, and events, and to the underlying process
(Perception, 2004). In this study, the term “people” implies TSA, “things” is
considered prohibited items, and lifting the ban is the “event”.
A “carry-on bag” is a small or compact bag that can be carried and stowed
on board an aircraft (Carry-on, 2011). As a result of the September 11 attacks,
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, all passengers are permitted to
bring one carry-on baggage and one personal item on board an aircraft. The carryon bag must meet size restrictions and be stowed properly in a storage compartment
or under a passenger seat (FAA, 2014). The TSA permits certain liquids, gels, and
aerosols as long as they comply with the 3-1-1 rules. In relation to the study, a
“liquid, aerosol, or gel” is defined as (a) a substance that is liquid when at room
temperature (b) an aerosol (c) a gel (d) a cream or (e) a paste (Substances Covered,
2013). While a sharp object is defined any item or object that has thin edge or fine
point that is capable to cutting or piercing another item or object (Sharp, 2011). The
TSA prohibited list contains specific liquids, gels, and aerosols, and sharp objects,
which is attached in Appendix B.
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The three dependent variables of this study are comfort, trust and
willingness to fly. The term “comfort” can be defined as a soothing feeling
individual experience. This feeling is experienced when our mind, body, and spirit
is satisfied (Comfort food, 2009). As passengers, will this soothing feeling change
if TSA lifts the ban on certain prohibited items? Or will the soothing feeling remain
unchanged regardless of prohibited item permitted on board? Economists define the
term “willingness” to pay as the amount of money an individual is willing to pay in
order to secure a specified benefit (Garrod, 2008). In terms of willingness to fly, are
passengers willing to continue flying if TSA lifted the ban on liquids, gels, and
aerosols, and sharp objects or will he/she rethink their decision to continue flying
given the items now permitted on board? Lastly, the term “trust” is defined
extensively in Chapter 2.
Summary
Chapter one outlines a brief introduction to the topic and the issues
currently affecting consumer’s perception of airport screening. Chapter two will
discuss the current regulations set by the Department of Homeland Security and
Transport Security Administration and the current programs they have introduced
over the past thirteen years to avoid a repetition of September 11, 2001. This
chapter will discuss any research that has been conducted or expert opinions from
conferences on how airport-screening procedures can be made a pleasant
experience for all travelling passengers. Chapter three includes a breakdown of the
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methodologies used to design the survey and how participants were chosen to
participate in the study.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The previous portion of this study introduced the purpose of the study,
problem statement, significance of conducting the study, and the research questions
that directed the study. Chapter 2 focuses on review of the literature pertaining to
the variables of the study concerning passengers’ attitudes and perception towards
current screening procedures and improvements that can benefit consumers’
perception of aviation security. The review provides a brief insight into aviation
security prior to 9/11 and after 9/11. A strong emphasis is made on the term trust
because it is a vital dependent variable and can affect the other dependent variables,
influence willingness and comfort, of an individual. If passengers trust the TSA’s
decision to lift the ban on prohibited items then he/she can demonstrate an adequate
comfort level and willingness to fly. Therefore, understanding trust, organizational
trust (TSA), and trust in the processes (layered security system) is of utmost
importance to this study because it can influence a participant’s decision in the
study.	
  	
  

Definitions of Prohibit, Trust, and Organizational Trust
The term “prohibit” is defined as, to order (someone) not to use or do
something (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). The TSA has designed a prohibited items list,
which is required to be followed by all passengers travelling by air, land, or sea on
board a public transport system. The list is constantly updated by the TSA. Items
that are generally permitted on board an aircraft may be subject to additional
screening or not allowed through the checkpoint if it triggers an alarm during the
screening process, appears to have been tampered with, or poses other security
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concerns. The final decision rests with TSA on whether to allow any items on the
plane (TSA, 2014). The prohibited items list is specific to items that are prohibited
in a carry-on, but permitted as a checked-in luggage and vice-versa, but certain
items are prohibited regardless on board a carrier due to its volatile nature e.g. gun
powder, aerosol, and lighter fluid (The TSA Blog, 2008).
The authors Lee and See defined “trust” as “the attitude that an agent will
help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and
vulnerability” (2004, p. 51). In the context of this study, the uncertainty and
vulnerability of commercial passengers will be studied in association with the TSA
lifting the ban on liquids, gels, aerosols, and sharp objects. The goal of this study is
to analyze passengers’ attitudes towards allowing liquids and sharp objects on
commercial aircraft, based on trusting the layered security system designed to
protect each individual.
The term trust can be further assessed in political terms, known as political
trust (Blind, 2006). Political trust occurs when citizens evaluate the government
and its policy, regarding political leaders has honest, fair, and efficient. This
political trust can be further directed towards specific organizations, such has the
TSA, known as organizational political trust. The organizational political trust
refers to “an issue-oriented perspective whereby citizens become trustful or
distrustful of government because they are satisfied or dissatisfied with policy
alternatives” (Blind, 2006, p. 3). In the context of this study, there is a probability
that participants may have a positive perception and be trustful of TSA’s proposed
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policies in the future because there has been no significant threat to the aviation
industry in recent years, considering they have been a competent and organized
agency for the past decade.
In a poll conducted in March 2001 by the Los Angeles Times, editors stated
that 29% of the American public trusted the government to do what is right just
about always or most of the time. After the events of September 11, the
Washington Post conducted a similar poll; the level of trust in the government had
increased significantly to about 64% (Chanley, 2002). This rise in trust can be
considered significant because a passenger may change his/her attitude when it
comes to national security. They may be more willing to accept change as long as
the change will not affect their sense of security. Multiple scholars have identified
public concern about threats to national security as a factor that may influence the
degree of cynicism about government (Chanley, 2002). In relation to this study,
consumers may be accepting to the proposed changes on prohibited items given the
stringent security measures that have been adopted.
A vast majority of passengers comply with security measures and do not
consider it to be a hassle because they trust the system in place (Mendenhall &
Schmidhofer, 2013). Therefore, before a change such as lifting the ban on
prohibited items, the TSA would be required to justify the decision with a thorough
analysis and results. In order to earn public trust, the TSA should approach
prospective changes by being more forthright and transparent with the public. This
could be done by thoroughly justifying the proposed changes, with an analysis of
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each change. To date, the TSA has not reported any form of performance or results
pertaining to the effectiveness of the security system. The last report published by
the TSA was in 2006, which highlighted the failure rate of detecting guns and
knives in carry-on luggage. The failure rate was predicted to be about 70%
(Mendenhall & Schmidhofer, 2013).
In order to gain trust from consumers, the TSA needs to inform the
consumers of the layered security system put in place. Even though the data is
public knowledge, methods of sharing this information to consumers is inadequate.
For instance, the decision to permit sharp knives in April 2013 was not justified in
a manner that would promote trust from the public. Perhaps if the change were
explained with a thorough analysis and conveyance of the strength of the aviation
security system, such as Air Marshal program, FFDO, hardened cockpit doors, etc.,
passengers would feel more comfortable with the change and trust the TSA more
with their safety. Therefore, the current study is designed to analyze the level in
which passengers trust the aviation security system, and to assess whether they are
willing to continue flying comfortably knowing certain prohibited items are
permitted on board.
The TSA and airline carriers have a list of prohibited items displayed
throughout the airport and on their websites, but it does not notify passengers of the
possible reasons why the item is prohibited. However, the TSA recently began
working towards removing certain items from the prohibited list. This could be an
indication that TSA is now focusing on finding items of high priority rather than
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small items, such as perfume or small pocketknives. Given the outstanding security
measures enforced, advanced technology and data collection agencies used to build
an effective security system, this would be considered a change in the direction of
TSA policies. However, these proposed decisions by the TSA have received
controversial reviews and protests from the aviation community. Therefore,
utilizing the limited data available on government websites such as TSA, ICAO,
and IATA, this study will gain insight into the current perception airline consumers
have towards prohibited items. Therefore, the current study will demonstrate if
liquids of any size and sharp objects on the TSA prohibited list were to be allowed,
would it change the comfort, trust, and willingness levels in which passengers
currently travel?
The events of September 11, 2001 were a failure of the aviation security
system managed by the Federal Aviation Administration within the U.S. For over a
decade, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), considered to be the
investigative agency of the U.S. Congress, conducted multiple studies on the
weaknesses of aviation security within the United States. The first report was
issued in 1987, the next two during the 1990s, and the last in 2000 (Dillingham
2000a; Fultz 1994, 1996; Peach 1987). The major concern in all these reports was
terrorism, but all proposed recommendations failed to gain consideration from
Congress to update the aviation security system. Since 1996, FAA had received
more than $1 billion from the U.S. Congress to upgrade the civil aviation security
program and purchase new security equipment for U.S. airports (Dillingham,

17

	
  

2000b). Despite receiving significant funding, FAA was to slow install the
equipment and implement stringent security regulations.
The devastating act of terrorism on September 11 was a result of a major
lapse in aviation security due to a chain of events, such as poor screening
procedures, improper methods of conveying crucial information in regards to
possible terrorist attacks, and failure of the government to address the weaknesses
of aviation security and airlines focusing on making profits rather than adhering to
safety and security recommendations proposed by the GAO. Authors Jeffrey Price
and Jeffrey Forrest highlighted the prior weaknesses of aviation security by stating,
“…careless attitudes by airport employees toward maintaining security procedures
may have been the reason certain airports were selected as the launch points for the
terrorists on 9/11” (Forrest & Price, 2013, p. 184). Sharp objects were able to be
smuggled on board the aircraft prior to 9/11, despite the terrorist undergoing
secondary screening; they were able to board the aircraft with box cutters. The
authors Camerer and Kunreuther in their journal titled “Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications” state that as humans, we are often more
willing to take a risk of incurring a large but small probability loss in the future
than accepting a smaller sure loss now (1989). The TSA have the workforce,
technology, and critical information necessary to avoid another terrorist event,
given the aviation security upgrade, we have the capability to take a small risk on
certain prohibited items, which we previously were unable to. If the FAA had taken
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the GAO’s multiple security recommendations into consideration, the events of
September 11, 2001 could have possibly been avoided.
Aviation Security Pre-September 11th, 2001
Prior to September 11, 2001, the FAA was tasked with the responsibility of
regulating airport and airline security. All airlines were required to conduct their
own passenger screening and baggage screening under the FAA guidelines. The
FAA hired aviation security inspectors to monitor the airline screening procedures
and airport security, inspectors were required to inform the FAA of any
irregularities or violations committed by the either parties. Airlines, in turn,
subcontracted this task to third party vendors; coincidently vendors with the lowest
bid were awarded the contract. These contractors were poorly trained and usually
worked for minimal wages, given the high workloads and strict attention to detail
that was required to perform the job efficiently. “Airlines and not the government
paid for the screening companies in the United States, there was little incentive to
hire the “best and brightest,” and more expensive, screening workforce” (Forrest &
Price, 2013, p. 108). The FAA had not developed a training curriculum or set
standards on how baggage screeners had to be trained, and the majority of the
information available was vague and open to interpretation. If the airlines were
found to be at fault in regards to any security breach, the FAA would impose fines
on the airline, which, in turn, would then pass the fines to the subcontractors
because they were responsible for the failure. The contractors, in turn, claimed to
have met the government’s “specific requirements” and pass the blame back to the
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FAA for not setting appropriate measures. In fact, all three of them could be right
(Hawley & Means, 2012).
A lapse in security was not an uncommon phenomenon before September
11. Individuals were allowed to bring sharp objects such has box cutters and small
knives on board an aircraft. Aviation security authorities were under the impression
that if an individual did take control of an aircraft, they could always be successful
in negotiating terms with the individual. Hijacking was prominent in the 1960s and
1970s. It is estimated over 240 hijackings or attempted hijacking in those ten years
occurred on flights between Cuba and the United States. Many of the hijackings
were done for political asylum, release of prisoners, or financial gain (Forrest &
Price, 2013). Pilots and flight attendants were instructed on how to gain control of a
possible hijacking situation but no additional resources were spent towards
prohibiting them from even occurring to begin with.
By 1974, the U.S. Congress had passed the Anti-Hijacking Act, requiring
airlines to screen passengers and their baggage. The act was a significant step in
aviation security because it instated armed law enforcement officers in the aircraft
(now known as Federal Air Marshals) and mandating the death penalty or 20 years
in prison for hijacking an aircraft (Department of State, 2006). In addition to the
act, the U.S. government created a profile of how a hijacker would behave. The
person of interest would often trigger the metal detector alarm, but upon further
screening, he or she would usually have no item in their possession that would raise
an alarm. And once the hijacker had the aircraft under their control, they would
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allow the aircraft to land and begin negotiations. These are how the majority of
hijackings previously occurred. For instance, the terrorist of September 11 had
triggered the metal detector prior to boarding the aircraft but did not raise
suspicion. The events of 9/11 caught the U.S. government by surprise because the
hijackers were more interested in the aircraft than the hostages.
In the United States, screening of domestically-flying passenger-checked
bags and carry-on bags did not commence until 1980. Despite this fact, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 17 stated that screening
of baggage was crucial to aviation security (Shanks & Bradley, 2004). Less than
5% off passenger bags were screened prior to 9/11, but that decision was based on
the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening (CAPPS) program. The CAPPS
program was a joint airline effort to deter possible bombing of the aircraft, not
hijacking, by conducting secondary screening when passengers checked in at the
airport ticket counter. The CAPPS program selected passengers based on the
characteristics of how the ticket was purchased. For example, the program
examined how the ticket was purchased, whether it was a one-way ticket, and how
the traveler responded to specific questions when asked by the ticketing agent. If
the agent had a doubt or suspected an odd behavior, the passenger would be
required to undergo secondary screening. The secondary screening consisted of
security screeners waving a metal detector over the passenger’s body after he/she
had passed through a walk-through metal detector (WTMDs). These secondary
screenings were not foolproof, as they were outdated, and WTMDs do not detect
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plastic explosives because the possibility of a terrorist designing a plastic explosive
was unheard of (Forrest & Price, 2013).
After the bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985 and subsequent bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, conventional X-ray machines were installed at a
majority of the airports to screen carry-on luggage. Also, measures were taken to
ensure no baggage was placed in the aircraft without the passenger on board, which
is known as the Passenger-Baggage Matching Program. The primary function of
the X-ray machines was to detect weapons and explosives, but neither device
actually “detected” weapons or explosives (Forrest & Price, 2013). A GAO study
conducted at 34 airports across the United States stated that the baggage screeners
detected prohibited items 48% to 99% of the time (GAO, 1987). Sharp objects,
such has knifes and box cutters, shorter than four inches were permitted on board
an aircraft. Operatives of 9/11 would bring box cutters on board an aircraft and
observe passengers and flight attendants reactions to the items (Forrest & Price,
2013). The gaps in aviation security were prominent and failure of the U.S.
government to tackle the issue in a proactive, rather than reactive, manner
contributed to the tragedy of September 11.
Current generation terrorists are no longer negotiating or demanding ransom
as they are focused on causing significant damage that can cripple the economic
stability of a country. According to Forrest and Price, we live in a “post-9/11 world
where aircraft are used as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and hostages are
merely victims (or obstacles) to the end result” (Forrest & Price, 2013, p. 51).
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Aviation Security Post-September 11th, 2001
The impact of September 11 was devastating. In addition to taking away
3,000 innocent lives, it damaged global security and the U.S. economy. It is
estimated the aviation industry experienced losses of $330 million per day after
September 11; passengers were skeptical of flying and major delays across the U.S.
contributed to this loss (Kumar et al., 2003). Immediately after the attack, in
November 2001, the U.S. Congress anonymously passed the Aviation and
Transportation Act. The act created the Transport Security Administration (TSA),
currently under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The TSA was charged with developing new regulations and policies to
enhance U.S. Transportation, but its primary focus has been airport security. Many
changes to the nation’s transportation network have been made in the area of
aviation (Wodele, 2005). In the budget for fiscal year 2004, $4.22 billion (86%) of
the TSA budget was allocated for aviation security (Bullock et al., 2006). The TSA
began its new responsibility by taking over all airline-screening responsibilities at
U.S. airports. All screening equipment used prior to 9/11 was replaced with stateof-the-art imaging technology. Passengers’ checked-baggage were now screened
using explosive detection equipment (EDS) and explosive trace detection testing
(ETD) to detect if passengers or their bags have come in contact with any explosive
materials. The TSA hired over 55,000 screeners (Forrest & Price, 2013) to deter
any possible terrorist act. In addition to screening passengers and their baggage, the
TSA oversees multiple other programs such as:
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•

Federal Air Marshal Program: it is estimated the program has over 5,000+
full timed marshals (Forrest & Price, 2013)

•

National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program: Canines are used at
airports and cargo depots to detect passengers smuggling counter band and
explosives. Canines are still considered to be more effective at detecting
any anomalies than current X-Ray equipment.

•

Training and certification of Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO): under
this program, only a selected few pilots have the privileges of carrying an
armed weapon on board an aircraft.

•

Crew Member Self-Defense Training Program: the TSA provides free selfdefense classes to crewmembers. Prior to 9/11, crewmembers would
comply with hijackers, but currently crewmembers go on the offensive to
protect the cabin. In 2003, an individual attempted to rush the cockpit, but
attendants and flight crew prevented the hijack of the plane (Baum, 2011).

•

Armed Security Officers Program: provides security law enforcement
officers (LEO) for General Aviation aircraft arriving and departing Ronald
Reagan National Airport.

•

Office of Training and Development: provides insight on all possible
explosives that may be used to bring down an aircraft.
All passengers that purchase airline tickets are screened via a

comprehensive list that contains names of individuals on the” no-fly list” and
“selectee list,” which are part of the terrorist watch list known as the National
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Terrorist Screening Center (NTSC). The NTSC is tasked with the responsibility of
identifying known and suspected terrorists. Prior to 9/11, the FAA’s no-fly list
consisted of only 12 individuals (Forrest & Price, 2013). The improved passenger
screening was known as “secure flight.” The TSA adopted a layered security
system (Refer to Appendix A) to deter any possible terrorist activity. The layered
system begins from the time passengers purchase a ticket up until they have arrived
at their destination and exit the airport. The TSA brought about multiple changes at
the airport and airline operators. But all these rapid changes have come at a high
cost. With many items prohibited in a carry-on, passengers are forced to check-in
bags. The current baggage system was designed to only handle a set amount of
checked bags and modifying the baggage system and installing EDS equipment to
accommodate more bags has been very costly. Renovating the baggage system is
complicated because airports have to still rely on FAA Airport Improvement
program (AIP) funding to make any major changes, which can be a very slow
process due to stringent budget allocation by the U.S. Federal Government. In
2000, delays were reported around twelve minutes per flight, and this delay on
average cost $10 billion in fees to the airline industry (DRI-WEFA, Inc., 2002). On
average the delay on October 2013 was reported to be around fifteen minutes per
flight (Lee, 2013).
After 9/11, passengers were required to wait for extend periods of time to
complete security check because the entire screening process was in a state of alert
and all passengers were required to go through a strict screening procedure.
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Passengers became accustomed to the change because a higher level of security
implied safer skies, but, overtime, frustration began to rise among travelers due to
long lines. The “goal” time for an individual to wait in the screening queue is ten
minutes (Hawley & Means, 2012). In August 2006, wait times once again increased
when the liquid bomb plot in the United Kingdom was discovered, passengers were
no longer able to bring any liquids or electronics on board because of the
possibility of terrorists using an electronic device to trigger a liquid based bomb in
the checked luggage. This TSA decision caused a major inconvenience among
passengers because all travelling passengers were required to check-in all baggage,
which led to further delays across the U.S. Screening carry-on baggage became a
greater challenge because the prohibited items list continues to grow, which could
possibly cause further delays in the future. The TSA currently averages between
175-250 passengers per hour per screening line, but there can be a significant
change in wait time in case of a security breach or an aviation related security issue
internationally (Forrest & Price, 2013). The introduction of TSA Pre Check and full
body scanners can decrease wait times significantly. TSA Pre Check was created to
accommodate business travelers and frequent flyers. Individuals selected for the
program are designated a special identification number and move rapidly through
security checks because they do not have to take off any clothing or accessories
when entering a full body scanner. Overall, since the formation of TSA, there have
been no significant terrorist acts on the same level as September 11. (Refer to
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Appendix B for the list of TSA prohibited items in a carry-on and Appendix C for
the timeline on security regulations introduced after the formation of TSA.).
TSA Layers of Aviation Security System
The TSA adopted a layered security system, which can be compared to the
James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (Young, Shorrock, and Faulkner, 2005). The
Swiss cheese model of accident causation theory is a series of cheese slices placed
in a vertical or diagonal manner. The slices relate to the multiple layers of defenses
an organization builds in order to prevent a hazard. On occasion, organizations can
become complacent, which can result in all the holes in each cheese slice
momentarily align, permitting a hazard to pass through the holes of all the defenses,
which leads to an accident. The FAA was complacent of aviation security screening
that resulted in an industry-defining event. After 9/11, the TSA took over all
screening procedures. They installed multiple defenses to deter another attack. The
layered system of security was designed to deter, detect, and disrupt any individual
with intent to cause harm to the airline industry. The primary layers include
checking of documents by Transport Security Officers (TSO’s), TSO’s examining
baggage using EDS and ETD, and Behavior Detection Officers (BDO’s) that use
SPOT (Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques) to analyze passenger
behavior and appearance (GAO, 2010). The SPOT program utilizes behavior and
appearance to identify individuals of interest. The program is similar to the
behavior detection analysis currently used by Israel’s El Al airlines. The decision
on TSA’s part to utilize the SPOT program as a level of defense has received
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criticism because it can be considered racial profiling (Forrest & Price, 2013). The
other layers included reinstating the Federal Air Marshal program, FFDO, and
advanced screening equipment.
As mentioned earlier, when passengers purchase a ticket, their information
is scanned through an FBI list that contains individuals of interest. Upon arriving at
the airport, multiple closed-circuit televisions’ (CCTV) are constantly monitoring
all areas of the airport, sterile and non-sterile areas. When a passenger approaches
the ticket counter, he/she is required to provide a government issued ID to the ticket
agent prior to receiving a boarding pass. All checked baggage then passes through
an EDS system. If the machine detects a threat item, the bag is sent to secondary
screening, which is known as the threat resolution room (TRR). A TSO then choses
to either physically inspect the bag or use a canine. If the bag cannot be cleared,
then the TSO notifies law enforcement to either detonate the item or remove the
device (Forrest & Price, 2013). As the passenger proceeds towards security check,
he/she is constantly monitored by law enforcement officials, airport employees, and
behavior detection officers’ (BDO). After successfully clearing security check,
which can consist of walking through a full body scanner, secondary screening in a
private room for selected individuals, and screening of carry-on bags, passengers
enter the sterile area. Passengers are constantly monitored by CCTV’s, which can
be coupled with biometric imaging devices for accurate facial recognition. Once on
board an aircraft, passengers may not be aware of the presence of an air marshal
and/or federal law enforcement officer on board. Pilots operating the aircraft may

28

	
  

or may not be enrolled in the FFDO program. This element of surprise helps in
deterring any possible attack once airborne. Present day crewmembers are also
trained to detect odd behavior and report any suspicious activity to the deck crew.
In December 2001, crewmembers and passengers successfully restrained Richard
Ried from blowing up American Airlines Flight 63 (Forrest & Price, 2013).
Richard Ried, also known as the Shoe Bomber, attempted to blow up a plane with
explosives packed into his shoes. Passengers and crewmembers restrained him as
he unsuccessfully tried to detonate the bomb. As a result of this event, passengers
departing from the United States are required to take off their shoes and place them
in the X-ray machine before walking through a full body scanner.
Since TSA adopted the layered security system, there have been at least 35
attempts to hijack an aircraft. In all attempts hijackers were restrained by
crewmembers, passengers, air marshals, or law enforcement personnel on board
(Forrest & Price, 2013). The decision on part of the U.S. government to establish
the TSA and encourage its evolution was regarded as, “…one of the federal
government’s greatest successes of the past half-century,” by Paul C. Light, a
Brookings Institution scholar and professor of New York University (Goo, 2005, p.
1). TSA’s new regulations set the benchmark in terms of how other airports around
the world manage aviation security. After 9/11, there has been a trend toward
proactive policy making in the United States and around the world (Forrest &
Price, 2013). (Refer to Appendix A for a chart that outlines the TSA Layered
Security System.	
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Secure Flight
In 2009, the TSA implemented Secure Flight, an airline passenger prescreening program. The program enhances aviation security domestically and
internationally through matching passenger information against a comprehensive
list of people of interest to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. All
passengers are required to submit their name, date of birth, and gender
simultaneously when purchasing an airline ticket (TSA, 2014). This is a crucial
layer of the TSA layered security program because it prevents individuals who are
currently on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft and identifies passengers on
the selected list to undergo secondary screening (TSA, 2014).
The secure flight program is similar to the first passenger-profiling program
adopted by the airlines, known as CAPPS. The TSA secure flight program is
designed to deter all possible acts of terrorism, while CAPPS was designed to
prevent bombings but not hijackings. Several of the 9/11 hijackers were flagged
under CAPPS (Forrest & Price, 2013). Individuals selected under CAPPS were
required to undergo secondary screening prior to boarding an aircraft, but TSA’s
secure flight requires individuals of interest to undergo a thorough secondary
screening in the presence of a law enforcement officer in an enclosed room.
Airlines continue to use CAPPS as a method to collect information of all
individuals purchasing tickets and then submit the list to Secure Flight for matching
against multiple lists. (Appendix D contains a flowchart of TSA’s secure flight.)
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Prohibited Item: Sharp Objects
In 2013, TSA proposed to permit passengers to carry folding pocketknives
with blades up to 2.36 inches in length, as well as sporting equipment (Burns,
2013). This was considered to be a controversial proposal because a regular box
cutter was used during the terrorist attacks on September 11t 2001, and it was
feared by some that this decision could cause a repetition of the attacks. This
proposal drew heavy criticism and was highly opposed by the airline community,
significantly by pilots and flight attendants, citing it could lead to terrorist
activities. Although, airline employees working in restaurants or conducting
maintenance in the sterile areas have access to sharp objects such as knives,
screwdrivers, and box cutters, and could pass the item to a terrorist, or the
individual could steal the object from the crewmember (Forrest & Price, 2013).
Nevertheless, the decision by the TSA to amend the regulations is a major step
towards changing consumers’ perception of current security measures by
decreasing wait times and amending the prohibited item list.
Prohibited Item: Liquids, Gels, and Aerosols
Initially, on August 10, 2006, TSA banned all liquids and gels from carryon bags as a result of a foiled transatlantic aircraft plot, where terrorists were
plotting to detonate liquid explosives disguised in soda bottles on board at least ten
airlines travelling from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The
rationale was to prevent potential bombers from carrying explosive components
onto an aircraft, then assembling the devices in aircraft lavatories (Forrest & Price,
2013). After extensive testing by independent organizations under the guidance of
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the TSA, the rule was eventually revised to the “3-1-1 rule”: 3.4 ounce (100ml)
bottle or less (by volume); 1 quart-sized, clear, plastic, zip-top bag; 1 bag per
passenger placed in screening bin (TSA, 2014). The average wait time to walk
through airport security check was about 15-20 minutes prior to the formation of
the TSA. The wait time has since doubled, varying between 30-45 minutes,
depending on the airport and time of day. (Yaukey & Benincasa, n.d.). These wait
times may have increased because passengers are now required to remove their
shoes, jackets, liquids, accessories, and laptops prior to walking through a full body
scanner.
The TSA prohibited list was tabulated taking into consideration all items
that can be volatile in nature, in addition to their potential use by terrorists, and
items that were allowed on board an aircraft were now subject to extensive
screening. Consumers were unable to bring bottled water or a bottle of perfume in
their carry-ons due to the possibility of a terrorist attack. Items deemed prohibited
by the TSA as carry-ons had to be stored in a checked-in luggage. These extensive
security measures have been successfully implemented by the TSA for over a
decade but have caused frustration and distress among travelling passengers. Over
the years, new regulations have been implemented and the TSA is moving towards
reducing the security screening wait times at airports by introducing the TSA precheck program, a passenger watch list, and collecting all travelling passenger
information when a flight ticket is purchased. In 2004, Tokyo Narita Airport had
begun testing liquid explosives detection technology to allow passengers to bring
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liquids on board (Forrest & Price, 2013). The TSA has also begun testing new
liquid screening systems that use light waves to screen containers with possible
explosive liquids (Forrest & Price, 2013), but there is no definite timeline on when
the new detection equipment will be installed. For now, the TSA prohibited items
list has had no changes since it was initiated; rather, the list continues to grow.
Previous Studies
There are very limited studies conducted in relation to consumer perception
of prohibited items. The primary focus of published studies has been on public
attitudes to current screening methods adopted by the Transport Security
Administration and their level of satisfaction with the security measures.
The study conducted by Mitchener-Nissen, Bowers, and Chetty (2011)
examined why travelling passengers preferred full body scanners or pat-downs and
measured the effects of presenting passengers unbiased information about scanners
at the screening checkpoint. The results were straight forward, as passengers were
more accepting to using a full body scanner (>90%) over a traditional pat down
(>80%). However, passengers were presented with unbiased information about
scanners, which resulted in a significant positive increase in their overall
favorability towards this technology and its current operation (Mitchener-Nissen,
Bowers, & Chetty, 2011). The authors in this study only examined one parameter
(full body scanners) and did not examine consumers’ perception to the current
prohibited items list. The study conducted by the researches can be replicated to
examine consumers’ perception of current TSA ban on liquids, gels, aerosols, and
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sharp objects. The study had its limitations because the questionnaire was presented
to participants at an airport that had the full body scanners installed. If the
questionnaire was presented to participants at an airport that did not have the
scanners, results could have varied considerably. The current study will also
present participants with a questionnaire and will include all passengers: TSA Pre
Check, Global Entry, and everyday passengers
A second study conducted by Gkritza, Niemeier, and Mannering (2006)
used data from 2002 and 2003 to estimate multinomial logit models to uncover
factors that determine passenger satisfaction at security screening points. The
results demonstrated that wait times do have an effect on customer satisfaction but
that could have been caused by multiple factors. Moreover, airport security
practitioners need to refine security procedures to have a stable satisfaction rate,
rather than focus on minimizing wait times. This study has significance because it
measures satisfaction based on archival data that was collected after September
2001. This is crucial to the current study because there could possibly be a
correlation between wait times and passenger perception. Given the advancement
in detection equipment at airports and no major hijacking/bombing event since
2001, passengers could be more willing to lift the ban on prohibited items, which,
in turn, could increase customer satisfaction at airports. Also, passengers may
demonstrate a positive attitude towards lifting the ban on liquids, gels, aerosols, and
sharp objects because they may want to move through security screening as quickly
as possible.
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The last study conducted by Yoo and Chul Choi (2006) was a study on the relative
importance of the means to improve passenger security checks at the airport, taking
into account the effectiveness of the screening tasks. The results of the study
demonstrated that the most important factor to raise effectiveness of passenger
screening would be human resources (Yoo & Choi, 2006). The researchers
distributed questionnaires to experts or individuals who have extensive
understanding and knowledge of screening procedures. In this study, participants
complained of long working hours and the inability of screening equipment to
detect all possible prohibited items. This study is significant because in April 2013,
the TSA proposed to lift the ban on sharp objects because screeners were spending
excessive time searching through every bag for a possible prohibited item, when
they should be focusing primarily on detecting explosives and more harmful items.
The study only suggests increasing screeners at security checkpoints to increase
performance levels, but since the formation of TSA, the U.S. government has spent
billions of dollars upgrading over 460 airports. This study is significant to the
current study because it may demonstrate attitudes that are more favorable to lifting
the ban on prohibited items.
Current Study
There have been no studies conducted that analyzes passenger’s perception
to prohibited items. The current study lays the foundation to enhance further
research into understanding how consumers perceive aviation security after more
than a decade of stringent security measures. Are passengers willing to continue
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flying if liquids, gels, aerosols, and sharp objects were once again permitted on
board? Are passengers going to feel comfortable knowing that other passengers
may have a box cutter in their carry-on baggage? And lastly, are passengers going
to trust flying given the TSA has lifted the ban on liquids, gels, aerosols, and sharp
objects?
Mitchener-Nissen, Bowers, and Chetty, (2011) conducted a study that
examined passengers’ attitude towards full body scanners but did not examine
passenger attitudes towards prohibited items. It has been over ten years since the
last major hijacking event, and, given the enormous funding that has been provided
by the government to upgrade security screening, it may be a matter of time before
they start permitting sharp objects and liquids on board an aircraft. The second
study addressed passenger satisfaction of aviation security screening based on wait
times but it does not address if passengers are willing to accept shorter wait times if
the TSA permits certain prohibited items. The current study will address these
issues in a non-biased manner. Lastly, Yoo and Choi (2006) conducted research on
current issues faced by screeners, but it doesn’t take passenger issues into
consideration. The researchers suggested better equipment and working
environment was a priority for screeners. The current study address this issue from
a passenger’s perspective, are they willing, comfortable, and trusting of the current
aviation security measures to accept the TSA lifting the ban on certain prohibited
items?
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Summary
The term trust was reviewed first because it was a vital dependent variable
of the study. If passengers trust the processes designed by the TSA, then they will
continue to have the same level of comfort and willingness to continue flying. If an
event was to occur, the trust in the system could be difficult to regain. A brief
overview of aviation security prior to September 11, 2001 was stated, which
highlights the failures of aviation security. This may have affected the trust of
passengers because they trusted the government to provide national security. The
study further highlights the changes the government has designed, adopted, and
enforced to build the current security system, which may have significantly
increased passengers’ trust in aviation security. Lastly, previously conducted
studies on passenger attitudes towards aviation security are discussed along with
their corresponding results. However, previous studies do not discuss the current
perception passengers have of prohibited items.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
The study was designed to determine if airline consumers have a positive or
negative perception of TSA prohibited items, specifically, restrictions on liquid,
gels, and aerosol sizes and sharp objects in a carry-on luggage. The primary goal of
the research was to determine out of a possible six conditions, which condition had
a significant positive and negative perception when compared to the rest.
Research Design
The research was a quantitative factorial design study, and the population
used for the study was a convenience sample. The participants were residents of the
United States, and in order to qualify to take the questionnaire, participants must
have travelled on a commercial aircraft that departed a U.S. airport after January
2007 and be at least 18 years of age. The questionnaire was distributed via
Amazon’s ® Mechanical Turk (MTurk) ® and was based on a seven-point Likerttype scale. The service provided a small remuneration to participants completing
the questionnaire. The G Power statistical software was used to calculate the power
and determine the minimum sample size of the study. The ANOVA a priori power
analysis was conducted with a medium effect size of 0.25, power = 0.8, α = .05,
which indicated a minimum sample size of approximately 211 participants, with 35
in each group.
An online survey program, Fluid Surveys, was used to create six separate
questionnaires, which also included demographic questions. The questionnaire was
administered to six independent groups. Participants were instructed to read the
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instructions and questions entirely prior to answering the questionnaire. (The
questionnaires can be found in Appendix F.)
Population and Sample
The target population for this study was individuals in the United States of
America that are 18 years of age and above who have travelled on board an airline
that operates under Part 121 operating rules. The scheduled carrier must have
departed from any U.S. airport where the Transport Security Administration
conducts security screening since January 1, 2007. The G*Power allocated a
sample size of 211 participants, with 35 in each groups. However, it was
determined that a sample size of 360 participants, with 60 in each group, would be
appropriate for this study. This decision was selected because even though
participants met the required age criteria, not all participants may have travelled on
board a commercial aircraft after January 2007.
Instrument
The questionnaire was presented online using Fluid Surveys and a Likert
style instrument. Questions developed for the study were tested among a group of
ten participants for clarity. Each questionnaire was made available online until 80
participants had taken the questionnaire. After the participant target was reached,
the questionnaire was automatically closed. Participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online service that allows
interested participants to participate in Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) in
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exchange for monetary compensation. Participation in a HIT is voluntary and
anonymous.
The questionnaire first asked if the participant was over 18 years of age.
Participants that selected “yes” were then allowed to proceed further; participants
that selected “no” were not allowed to participate in the study. The questionnaire
then goes on to ask participants if they had travelled on board an aircraft that
departed a U.S. airport after January 1. 2007. Participants that chose yes were then
asked to answer three scenario-based questions. The first scenario measured the
participants’ comfort, the second scenario measured the participants’ trust, and the
third scenario measured the participants’ willingness. After successfully answering
the three questions, participants were then asked four demographic questions.
Participants who did not answer all the questions on the survey were not be
included in the study. (Raw data is available upon request. A copy of the
questionnaire is attached in Appendix F.)
Research Procedure
As mentioned earlier, only participants that meet the criteria set by the
researcher were allowed to participate in the study. All participants were required
to sign an electronic consent form prior to participating in the study. A brief
description of current TSA policies on liquids, gels, aerosols, and sharp objects was
presented to participants prior to beginning the survey. The 7-point Likert scaled
questions were presented in random order. This was done to ensure consistency
when participants answered the questions, and to reduce bias. The 7-point Likert
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scaled response scale ranged from Extremely Uncomfortable/Distrustful/Unwilling,
denoted as -3, to Extremely Comfortable/Trusting/Willing, denoted as +3.
The two independent variables are (1) amount of Liquids, Gels, and
Aerosols and (2) ban or non-ban of Sharp Objects. The first independent variable
had three levels (a) Liquids, Gels, and Aerosols (b) Liquids, Gels, and Aerosols in
sizes of 3-1-1 and (c) Liquids, Gels, and Aerosols in sizes greater than 3-1-1. The
second independent variable consisted of two levels (a) No Sharp Objects on board
and (b) Sharp Objects permitted on board. The TSA “3-1-1” regulation specifies:
3.4 ounce (100ml) bottle or less (by volume); 1 quart-sized, clear, plastic, zip-top
bag; 1 bag per passenger placed in screening bin (TSA, 2014). The matrix in Table
1 identifies the various interactions between the liquids and sharp objects
conditions.
Table 1: Matric analyzing relationship between variables.
Sharp
Objects
Sharp
Objects
Prohibited
Sharp
Objects
Permitted

Liquids, Gels, & Aerosols
All Liquids, Gels, &
All Liquids, Gels, &
All Liquids, Gels, &
Aerosols Prohibited
Aerosols sizes of 3-1Aerosols container
1 only Permitted
sizes greater than 31-1 Permitted
Condition 1
Condition 3
Condition 5

Condition 2

Condition 4

Condition 6

Data Analysis
Based on the above literature review on trust, the three dependent variables
of comfort, trust, and willingness will have high internal consistency, as measured
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by Cronbach’s Alpha, and therefore were merged into one dependent variable for
the purposes of data analysis. The data from the survey was analyzed using an
ANOVA using IBM SPSS. SPSS is exploratory data analysis and modeling
software. It presents the results of analysis both graphically and numerically. The
limitations, conclusions, and discussions are presented in Chapter 5. The Likert
scaled questions are significant to the study because it demonstrated six possible
outcomes to the study:
!1! = We predict no difference in comfort/trust/willingness as a function of the
amount of liquids/gels/aerosols that are allowed on board.
!1! = We predict a difference in comfort/trust/willingness as a function of the
amount of liquids/gels/aerosols that are allowed on board.
!2! = We predict no difference in comfort/trust/willingness as a function of
whether or not sharp objects are allowed on board.
!2! = We predict a difference in comfort/trust/willingness as a function of
whether or not sharp objects are allowed on board.
!3! = We predict no significant interaction between the two independent
variables.
!3! = We predict a significant interaction between the two independent variables.
The analysis of the data is explained thoroughly in Chapter 4.
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Protection of Participants’ Rights
An Exempt Institutional Review Board (IRB) form was submitted for
approval prior to data collection. The IRB agreed that the study posed minimal risk
to participants.
Summary
Participation in the study was voluntary and anonymous. The sample size
was 363 individuals that reside in the U.S and were a minimum of 18 years of age
that have travelled onboard a Part 121 scheduled air carrier since January 1st, 2007.
The survey consisted of four research questions and four demographic questions
and was distributed via Amazon’s ® Mechanical Turk (MTurk) ®, and responses
were based on a seven-point Likert scale. Each participant took an average of three
to 5 minutes to complete the survey. The survey methodology did not collect any
identifying information.
The study focused on two variables: liquids, gels, and aerosol sizes and
sharp objects. The survey was designed to acquire responses to questions
formulated based on the above two variables. The 7-point Likert-type scaled
response scale ranged from Extremely Uncomfortable/Distrustful/Unwilling, to
Extremely Comfortable/Trusting/Willing. Responses from the survey will be
analyzed using an ANOVA using IBM SPSS software. The results from the SPSS
software will be extrapolated using descriptive statistics. Results of the study are
presented next, in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
As mentioned in Chapter 3, a two-factor (3 x 2) Analysis of Variance was
conducted to evaluate passenger’s perception towards TSA prohibited items,
specifically sharp objects and liquid, gels, and aerosol sizes. The two independent
variables in this study are TSA liquid sizes (no liquids permitted, TSA liquid size
3-1-1 permitted, and all liquid sizes permitted) and sharp objects (no sharp objects
permitted and sharp objects permitted). 	
  The dependent variable is comfort, trust,
and willingness score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of comfort, trust,
and willingness to board an aircraft.
For the dependent variable, we conducted a reliability test in SPSS that
measures internal consistency, which studies how closely related a set of items are
as a group because the response to one dependent variable had an influence on the
other two dependent variables. For example, if a passenger were trustful of TSA
permitting sharp objects and all liquids, gels, and aerosols container sizes greater
than 3-1-1 on board an aircraft, then more than likely they would be willing and
comfortable in boarding an aircraft. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the three
items was .93, suggesting that the items have relatively high internal consistency
(Kline, 1993). Therefore, we justified combining this data into one measure. The
means and standard deviations for the combined measure as a function of the two
factors are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Consumer Perception*
Sharp
Objects

Sharp
Objects
Prohibited

Liquids, Gels, & Aerosols
All Liquids, Gels, & All Liquids, Gels, & All Liquids, Gels,
Aerosols Prohibited Aerosols sizes of 3& Aerosols
1-1 only Permitted
container sizes
greater than 3-1-1
Permitted
1.65
1.52
.87
(1.25)
(1.35)
(1.46)

Sharp
-.16
.22
Objects
(1.62)
(1.75)
Permitted
*Standard Deviations shown in parentheses

-.17
(1.91)

Tests of Between-Subject Effects
Table 3: Two-way Analysis of Variance for Consumer Perception.
Source

SS

df

MS

F

p

Sharp Objects

173.34

1

Liquids, Gels, and Aerosol Sizes

17.47

2

8.73

3.57

.029

Sharp Objects x Liquids, Gels, and

9.15

2

4.57

1.87

.16

Within (Error)

873.00

357

2.45

Total

1236.56 363

173.34 70.89 .000

Aerosol Sizes

The results of the two-way ANOVA indicated there was a significant main effect
on liquid, gels, and aerosols sizes onboard an aircraft, on the comfort, trust, and
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willingness of passengers, F(2, 357) = 3.57, p < .03, !"! = .02. In Figure 1, when
we ignore sharp objects, the overall comfort, trust, and willingness to board an
aircraft is very similar when passengers are prohibited from brining onboard any
liquids, and when they are restricted to TSA 3-1-1 regulations. The significant main
effect is likely because to the drop in comfort, trust, and willingness when liquids
of all sizes are permitted onboard an aircraft. This indicates that a passenger may
likely demonstrate a neutral perception (of comfortable, trusting, and willing)
towards boarding an aircraft when there are no liquid, gels, and aerosol size
restrictions. The error bars in the graph represent the standard error of the mean.

	
  

Figure 1: Graph showing the main effect of liquid, gels, & aerosols.
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Additionally, the results of the two-way ANOVA indicated there was a significant
main effect on sharp objects being permitted or prohibited onboard an aircraft, on
the comfort, trust, and willingness of passengers, F(1, 357) = 70.89, p < .001,
!"! = .17. In Figure 2, when we ignore liquids, gels, and aerosol sizes there is a
significant main effect, which is reflected by the drop in passengers comfort, trust,
and willingness, when sharp objects are permitted. This indicates that a passenger
is uncomfortable, untrusting, and unwilling to board an aircraft if sharp objects
were prohibited. The error bars in the graph represent the standard error of the
mean.

Figure 2: Graph showing the main effect of sharp objects
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Lastly, The results of the two-way ANOVA indicated there was no significant

interaction between sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosol sizes, on the
passengers comfort, trust, and willingness to board an aircraft, F(2, 357) = 1.87,
p = .16, !"! = .01. In Figure 3 and Figure 4, we observe that there is no significant
interaction, which us usually shown by a parallel line in Figure 4. We can observe
that when passengers are permitted to bring sharp objects onboard, the level of
comfort, trust, and willingness to board an aircraft drop significantly, when sharp
objects are prohibited the level increases. This gives us an indication that
passengers likely have a negative perception of sharp objects in a carry-on luggage
and a positive perception of liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size in a carry-on.
The error bars in the graph represent the standard error of the mean.

	
  

Figure 3: Graph showing no interaction effect.
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Figure 4: Graph depicting the parallel lines, indicating no interaction effect.
Post Hoc Test
There were three levels of the liquids, gels, and aerosols variables (no
liquids permitted, TSA liquid size 3-1-1 permitted, and all liquid sizes permitted).
Therefore, we conducted a post hoc test. The Bonferroni post hoc test showed that
participants’ comfort/trust/willingness was similar when prohibited from bringing
any liquids, gels, and aerosols in carry-on (Level 1) and when permitted to TSA
3-1-1 liquid, gel, and aerosol sizes (Level 2), p = 1.00 and !!"## =    −.12.
Additionally, participants’ comfort/trust/willingness was similar when permitted to
bring any size liquids, gels, and aerosols in a carry-on (Level 3) and when
prohibited from bringing any liquids, gels, and aerosols in a carry-on (Level 1),
p = .19 and  !!"## =    −.37. However, participants’ comfort/trust/willingness were
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significantly lower when permitted to bring any size liquid, gel, and aerosol in a
carry-on (Level 3), when compared to permitting the TSA’s 3-1-1 liquid, gels, and
aerosol sizes (Level 2), p < .042 and !!"## =    −.50.
Research Question and Hypothesis
The responses gathered from the survey provided sufficient information to
answer our research questions.
1. Based on the sample data, participants seemed comfortable, trusting, and
willing to have liquids carried on-board the aircraft. However, there was a
significant difference in comfort/trust/willingness scores between group of
participants that were permitted to bring onboard any size liquids, gels, and
aerosols and group of participants that were prohibited from bringing any
liquids and group of participants that were allowed the TSA 3-1-1 size
restriction.
2. Based on the sample data, participants seemed comfortable, trusting, and
willing to have sharp objects prohibited in a carry-on luggage. However,
there was a significant difference in comfort/trust/willingness scores
between group of participants that were permitted to bring sharp objects in a
carry –on and group of participants that were prohibited from brining sharp
object in a carry-on. Overall, participants that were permitted to bring
sharp-objects in a carry-on seemed to have a neutral perception towards
sharp-objects.
Our decision with respect to the null hypothesis is as follows:

50

	
  

1. We hypothesized no difference in trust/willingness/comfort as a function of
the amount of liquids/gels/aerosols that are allowed on board; but based on
the sample data, we had to reject the null hypothesis because there was a
significant difference in trust/willingness/comfort as a function of the
amount of liquids/gels/aerosols that are allowed on board. The p value
equals .001, which is less than or equal to .05 (α). (Please refer to Table 3
and Figure 1.)
2. We hypothesizes no difference in trust/willingness/comfort as a function of
whether or not sharp objects are allowed on board; but based on the sample
data, we had to reject the null hypothesis because there was a significant
difference in trust/willingness/comfort as a function of whether or not sharp
objects are allowed on board. The p value equals .029, which is less than or
equal to .05 (α). (Please refer to Table 3 and Figure 2.)
3. We hypothesized no significant interaction between the two independent
variables. Based on the sample data, our hypothesis was correct, we failed
to reject the null hypothesis because there was no significant interaction
between the two independent variables. The p value equals .156, which is
greater than .05 (α). (Please refer to Figure 3 and Figure 4.)
Overall, participants demonstrated a neutral perception to scenarios that
allowed sharp objects to be brought on-board an aircraft in a carry-on luggage.
However, participants demonstrated a positive perception in scenarios that
prohibited sharp objects from being brought on-board an aircraft in a carry-on
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luggage. In regards to interactions, we concluded that there was no significant
interaction between the independent variables because regardless of group
association, participants in all groups had a lower perception when sharp objects
were permitted in a carry-on luggage and had a higher perception when sharp
objects were prohibited. (Please refer to Figure 4.)
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Overview
The purpose of this study was to investigate airline consumers’ perception
of TSA prohibited items, with respect to their comfort, trust, and willingness
towards TSA liquids, gels, and aerosols policy and sharp objects in carry-on
luggage. The study was designed to gauge passengers’ perceptions of whether a
certain scenario would have a more positive or negative perception when compared
to other scenarios. This assessment was based on grouping the study participants in
six separate groups and measuring each group’s perceived level of perception to the
scenario. The independent variables were sharp objects (sharp objects permitted
and sharp objects prohibited) and liquids, gels, and aerosol sizes (all liquids, gels,
and aerosols prohibited, TSA 3-1-1 size restriction, and all sizes of liquids, gels and
aerosols permitted). The dependent variable was a participant’s comfort, trust, and
willingness level. The sample population for the study was n = 363, which
consisted of 197 males and 166 females.
Explanation of Findings
The first hypothesis stated that there would be no significant
difference in a participant’s comfort, trust, and willingness as a function of the
amount of liquids, gels and aerosols that are allowed on board. However, results
from the participants suggested that there was indeed a significant difference. It
was interesting to note that even though there was a significant difference,
participants in general had a positive perception. This indicated that participants
were comfortable, trusting, and willing to board an aircraft regardless of whether
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these items were prohibited, permitted, or a current TSA 3-1-1 regulation.
Participants had a much higher positive perception towards the current TSA 3-1-1
size regulation when compared to permitting all sizes to prohibiting all sizes on
board. These findings suggested that participants in general were trusting of the
current security measures and could be of valuable use to the TSA that were
looking to make changes to the current regulations. This way, TSA officers can
effectively spend their time looking for items of higher threat. If people were
willing to trust that any proposed change to liquid, gels, and aerosols would not
pose a serious threat to aviation security, then it would have a positive influence on
passenger satisfaction. In the study conducted by Gkritza, Niemeier, and
Mannering (2006), they mentioned that passenger satisfaction was not based on
reducing wait times but refining security measures. The responses to this
questionnaire demonstrated that if the TSA were to refine their 3-1-1 size
restrictions on liquids, gels and aerosols, then passengers would continue to have a
positive perception of the change.
The second hypothesis stated that there would be no significant difference
in a participant’s comfort, trust, and willingness as a function to whether or not
sharp objects were allowed on board. The results from the participants suggested
that there was a significant difference. The participants had a positive perception
towards not allowing sharp objects in carry-on luggage and a negative perception
towards allowing sharp objects in a carry-on luggage. What was interesting to note
was that even though there was a significant difference, passengers did not have a
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strong negative perception towards the proposed rule change. The authors Lee and
See (2004) defined the word trust as the attitude that an agent will help achieve an
individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.
The responses to scenarios that permitted sharp objects could possibly suggest that
participants may have answered the scenario with a degree of uncertainty and
vulnerability. Participants trusted the government to protect them when national
security is threatened. Based on the responses, participants might not have
uncomfortable, untrusting, and unwilling feelings, yet they have remained neutral
to the proposed change with the hope that if there were a threat based on the rule
change, the government would be able to protect them. After September 11,
passengers trusted the government with the establishment of an independent
security agency to protect them from any possible terrorist attacks.
The conductors of this study assumed that if sharp objects were to be permitted in
carry-on luggage, then passengers would have a neutral perception.
Another possible explanation to participant responses to sharp
objects may be that American consumers are not inclined to totally trust anything
without questioning authority (Couchen & Lieching, 2008). This probability was
supported by the findings that participants were somewhat neutral to the idea of
having sharp objects in carry-on luggage. One assumption could be that
participants may be open to the proposed change. However, participants might
demand that TSA justify itself as to how the proposed change would benefit
aviation security while clarifying what steps would be taken to mitigate the threat
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of potential passengers using sharp objects to cause harm to others. As mentioned
above, participants trusted the government to keep them safe but permitting sharp
objects in carry-ons may be considered a step back by certain participants. This can
also be observed in the liquid, gels, and aerosol size restrictions, where TSA’s 3-11 had a much higher perception to the other levels.
There is also a probability that participants may have responded to the study
based on organizational political trust. As mentioned in chapter 2, citizens can
become trustful and satisfied with government proposed policy alternatives (Miller,
1974). The results of the study are an indication of this trust. We can only assume
that participants are trusting of the TSA because their sole purpose is to protect the
transportation system of the U.S. Therefore, if in the future TSA does propose a
change to the prohibited item list, participants may have a positive or neutral
perception to the policy because they trust the TSA.
The last hypothesis stated that there would be no significant interaction
between liquids, gels, aerosol sizes, and sharp objects. The results from the study
supported this hypothesis. This was interesting because a majority of participants
had a positive perception or a neutral perception towards this scenario they were
presented with. The group that had the highest positive perception when compared
to other groups preferred to have sharp objects permitted and liquids, gels, and
aerosols of all sizes prohibited on board. This decision could possibly be based on
convenience and safety. It was considered convenient because passengers would
not have to worry if they were adhering to the TSA size restrictions properly and
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sharp objects can be packed in checked luggage. It has influenced safety because it
has reduced the chances of passengers using sharp objects to cause harm to other
passengers while the concern of possible liquid explosives in a carry-on has
drastically reduced. However, these results may not be a true representation of the
entire population because we have limited knowledge of our participants’
background. The study is limited to participants from MTurk. The raw data
consisted of participants that had a strong positive perception and a negative
perception towards this scenario, but the mean of the data suggested that overall
participants were quite comfortable, trusting and willing to board an aircraft.
Therefore, there was a probability that certain participants could have answered the
questionnaire from a convenience point of view, while others could have answered
from a safety point of view.
Another possible explanation for the positive perception and neutral
perception may be the participants’ sense of security. This observation may be
related back to the study conducted by Mitchener-Nissen, Bowers, and Chetty
(2011). They surveyed why travelling passengers preferred full body scanners to
pat-downs. About 85.8% justified their selection, the full body scanner, based on
safety and stated that the full body scanners were less intrusive. The difference
between our study and the previous study was that our participants were not
provided with any information prior to participating in the study, while MitchenerNissen, Bowers, and Chetty (2011) presented all their participants with detailed
information about full body scanners and its effectiveness. Despite these
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differences, the responses from our study had a positive perception. Therefore,
future studies should examine if participants may be willing, trusting, and
comfortable to board an aircraft with sharp objects and liquids of all sizes in their
carry-ons, as long as they were convinced that effective security measures were
already in place to stop another possible terrorist attack.
The study indicated that passengers either had a positive perception or
neutral perception to sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols size restriction.
Overall, the study provided significant information that demonstrated passengers
are fairly trusting, comfortable and willing to board an aircraft if the ban was lifted
on sharp objects, and liquids, gels, and aerosol sizes.
Practical Implementation
There are certain real-world applications of the findings from this study.
The airlines and TSA can conduct a similar study to gauge passengers’ perception
of certain regulations. The study suggested that passengers are willing, trusting and
comfortable in each of the conditions. If the TSA and airlines were to provide the
passengers with additional information on the positives of a possible rule change,
passengers may be more willing to accept it (Mitchener-Nissen, Bowers, & Chetty,
2011).
The findings of this study may help guide the future actions of the TSA and
airline industry regarding public opinion of current prohibited items. If either
scenario were to be adopted efficiently, there could be a possibility passengers may
demonstrate a higher positive perception when compared to the results of our study.
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More importantly, it may make flying a more comfortable experience for all the
passengers.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
Eventually the restriction on liquid sizes will likely be lifted because
advanced liquid screening technology has already begun testing at smaller airports
in Europe (Reals, 2013). The study can be taken further by analyzing aviation
employees’ responses only. The aim of the study should be to gauge the level of
trust passengers will continue to have with the security system, when rules begin to
be amended in the future. One potential avenue to explore could be to ask
passengers what changes they would like to see in the current system or what
current regulation they would like to see being executed in a different manner. The
TSA Pre-Check is currently one program that has received positive reviews but
unfortunately not everyone qualifies for the program because the program conducts
thorough background checks going back as far as ten years. However, those
passengers that successfully qualify for TSA Pre-Check are allowed to move much
quicker through airport security, which, in itself, is a stressful situation at major
airports. If the program was to be amended, which would be more willing to accept
a large population of various backgrounds, it may contribute towards increased
passenger satisfaction.
The study can also be replicated to compare airline professional’s
perception in each scenario versus passenger’s perception. This can be vital
because aviation professionals may answer the scenario from a safety point of view
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and a passenger may answer from a safety and convenient point of view. Another
future study can also take the dependent variable of convenience and safety into
consideration when designing scenario-based questionnaires. The current study can
also be altered by providing passengers with unbiased aviation security measures
and the programs designed to mitigate any possible threat prior to participating in
the questionnaire. This method could possibly demonstrate a much higher positive
perception than the current study.
The major limitation in regards to TSA policies is participants’ responses
being influenced by external factors. In our study, we were unable to identify
detailed background of our participants; therefore, we had to make an assumption
that participants may have answered the questionnaire based on safety; however,
other confounding variables (e.g. convenience) may have been affecting
participants’ responses. Another possible limitations are that participants recruited
on MTurk belonged to a wide variety of age groups ranging from 18 years to 62
years. There is a probability that if the scenarios were to be worded and presented
in a different manner, we could have received completely different results.
Therefore when conducting future studies on TSA polices it should be done
with a certain degree of caution. Participants lack knowledge of the current security
system and even a small, seemingly insignificant security related event may alter
their responses, which may sway the results of the study.
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Conclusions
This study successfully displayed the perception airline consumers have
towards TSA liquid restrictions and bans on sharp objects. The responses of the
general public were gathered, which suggested that passengers on average were
quiet willing, trusting, and comfortable to board an aircraft if sharp objects were
prohibited. The data from this study suggests that passengers were neutral towards
permitting sharp objects in the carry-on luggage. Overall, the results of this study
are significant to understand the current perception passengers have of current TSA
items, which is viable to understanding how passengers perceive the aviation
security system, with the determinant being lack of sufficient knowledge of the
current system.
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APPENDIX A: TSA LAYERS OF AVIATION SECURITY
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APPENDIX B: TSA PROHIBITED ITEM LIST BROCHURE

(Source: tsa.gov, 2014)
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APPENDIX C: TSA SECURITY REGULATIONS TIMELINE

(Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2013)
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APPENDIX D: SECURE FLIGHT
	
  

(Source: GlobalSecurity.org)
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APPENDIX E: TSA PROPOSED SHARP OBJECTS SIZES

(Source: The TSA Blog Team, 2013)
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: You will be presented with some information on current Transport
Security Administration (TSA) procedures and you will then be asked some
questions on certain scenarios. Following that, you will be asked some
demographic questions. The data collection process is anonymous and your
response will remain confidential. This should take you about 2-3 minutes.
Condition 1
Have you traveled on-board a commercial aircraft that departed from a U.S. airport
since January 2007?
•
•

Yes
No

Question 1: Given the following scenario, please indicate how comfortable you
would be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size
in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Uncomfortable
Quite Uncomfortable
Slightly Uncomfortable
Neutral
Slightly Comfortable
Quite Comfortable
Extremely Comfortable

Question 2: Given the following scenario, please indicate how trusting you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size
in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Untrusting
Quite Untrusting
Slightly Untrusting
Neutral
Slightly Trusting
Quite Trusting
Extremely Trusting
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Question 3: Given the following scenario, please indicate how willing you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size
in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Unwilling
Quite Unwilling
Slightly Unwilling
Neutral
Slightly Willing
Quite Willing
Extremely Willing

Condition 2
Have you traveled on-board a commercial aircraft that departed from a U.S. airport
since January 2007?
•
•

Yes
No

Question 1: Given the following scenario, please indicate how willing you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size are
prohibited in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Unwilling
Quite Unwilling
Slightly Unwilling
Neutral
Slightly Willing
Quite Willing
Extremely Willing

Question 2: Given the following scenario, please indicate how trusting you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size are
prohibited in a carry-on bag.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Untrusting
Quite Untrusting
Slightly Untrusting
Neutral
Slightly Trusting
Quite Trusting
Extremely Trusting

Question 3: Given the following scenario, please indicate how comfortable you
would be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of any size are
prohibited in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Uncomfortable
Quite Uncomfortable
Slightly Uncomfortable
Neutral
Slightly Comfortable
Quite Comfortable
Extremely Comfortable

Condition 3
Have you traveled on-board a commercial aircraft that departed from a U.S. airport
since January 2007?
•
•

Yes
No

Question 1: Given the following scenario, please indicate how comfortable you
would be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of size 3-11 are permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Uncomfortable
Quite Uncomfortable
Slightly Uncomfortable
Neutral
Slightly Comfortable
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•
•

Quite Comfortable
Extremely Comfortable

Question 2: Given the following scenario, please indicate how willing you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of size 3-11 are permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Unwilling
Quite Unwilling
Slightly Unwilling
Neutral
Slightly Willing
Quite Willing
Extremely Willing

Question 3: Given the following scenario, please indicate how trusting you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of size 3-11 are permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Untrusting
Quite Untrusting
Slightly Untrusting
Neutral
Slightly Trusting
Quite Trusting
Extremely Trusting

Condition 4
Have you traveled on-board a commercial aircraft that departed from a U.S. airport
since January 2007?
•
•

Yes
No

Question 1: Given the following scenario, please indicate how comfortable you
would be completing a commercial flight?
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You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of size 3-1-1 are
permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Uncomfortable
Quite Uncomfortable
Slightly Uncomfortable
Neutral
Slightly Comfortable
Quite Comfortable
Extremely Comfortable

Question 2: Given the following scenario, please indicate how trusting you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of size 3-1-1 are
permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Untrusting
Quite Untrusting
Slightly Untrusting
Neutral
Slightly Trusting
Quite Trusting
Extremely Trusting

Question 3: Given the following scenario, please indicate how willing you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of size 3-1-1 are
permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Unwilling
Quite Unwilling
Slightly Unwilling
Neutral
Slightly Willing
Quite Willing
Extremely Willing
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Condition 5
Have you traveled on-board a commercial aircraft that departed from a U.S. airport
since January 2007?
•
•

Yes
No

Question 1: Given the following scenario, please indicate how trusting you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of all sizes
are permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Untrusting
Quite Untrusting
Slightly Untrusting
Neutral
Slightly Trusting
Quite Trusting
Extremely Trusting

Question 2: Given the following scenario, please indicate how willing you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of all sizes
are permitted in a carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Unwilling
Quite Unwilling
Slightly Unwilling
Neutral
Slightly Willing
Quite Willing
Extremely Willing

Question 3: Given the following scenario, please indicate how comfortable you
would be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
prohibits you from bringing sharp objects but liquids, gels, and aerosols of all sizes
are permitted in a carry-on bag.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Uncomfortable
Quite Uncomfortable
Slightly Uncomfortable
Neutral
Slightly Comfortable
Quite Comfortable
Extremely Comfortable

Condition 6
Have you traveled on-board a commercial aircraft that departed from a U.S. airport
since January 2007?
•
•

Yes
No

Question 1: Given the following scenario, please indicate how willing you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of all sizes in a
carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Unwilling
Quite Unwilling
Slightly Unwilling
Neutral
Slightly Willing
Quite Willing
Extremely Willing

Question 2: Given the following scenario, please indicate how comfortable you
would be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of all sizes in a
carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Uncomfortable
Quite Uncomfortable
Slightly Uncomfortable
Neutral
Slightly Comfortable
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•
•

Quite Comfortable
Extremely Comfortable

Question 3: Given the following scenario, please indicate how trusting you would
be completing a commercial flight?
You have to fly from Miami to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. The TSA
permits you to bring sharp objects and liquids, gels, and aerosols of all sizes in a
carry-on bag.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Extremely Untrusting
Quite Untrusting
Slightly Untrusting
Neutral
Slightly Trusting
Quite Trusting
Extremely Trusting
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APPENDIX G: OUTPUT OF POWER ANALYSIS
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